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Abstract 
This paper analyses the influence of social capital on corporate valuation for a sample of 55 
countries over the period 1995-2012. The results suggest that social capital is an important 
determinant of corporate valuation. Interpersonal trust and civic cooperation enhance 
corporate valuation, even though other institutional and legal characteristics are 
considered. Furthermore, our results reveal that corporate valuation increases with the 
GDP annual growth rate, legal enforcement and the protection of shareholders' rights, but 
that it is negatively affected by corruption and protection of creditors' rights. We also 
obtain some evidence suggesting that civic cooperation has a greater influence over 
corporate valuation in poorer countries. 
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CORPORATE VALUATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Several papers have shown that effective legal systems enhance corporate valuation, as 
investors are able to expect fair returns in these environments, revealing that country 
characteristics influence corporate valuation. La Porta et al. (2002) find evidence of a higher 
valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders. This finding 
provides support for the importance of the expropriation of minority shareholders in many 
countries, as well as for the role of the rule of law in limiting such expropriation. Lee and Ng 
(2006) show that firms in more corrupt countries trade at significantly lower market multiples 
for a sample of companies from 44 countries, suggesting that corruption has significant 
economic consequences for shareholder value. Chua et al. (2007) analyse the key factors that 
drive cross-country differences in valuation for a sample of 49 countries over the period 1999-
2004. Cross-country differences in corporate valuation are significantly explained by the 
growth options of countries, shareholder rights, the enforcement of insider trading laws and 
the degree of capital market openness. 
Social capital has attracted a great deal of academic attention, especially since Putnam (1993) 
analysed the differences in the economic and institutional performance of northern and 
southern Italy, suggesting that civic engagement can lead to the enhancement of economic 
and institutional performance. Civic engagement gives rise to trust between the members of 
the community, even though they may disagree on key issues. Trust has been defined by La 
Porta et al. (1997) as the “propensity of people in a society to cooperate to produce socially 
efficient outcomes and to avoid inefficient non cooperative traps such as in the prisoner’s 
dilemma”. The economic benefits of social capital have been argued not only by Putnam 
(1993), but also by Goergen (2013), Goergen et al. (2013), Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta et 
al. (1997), and Zak and Knack (2001). 
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Within this context, the present paper focuses on the influence of social capital on corporate 
valuation. We extend the empirical literature on cross-country corporate valuation, 
considering the effect of the social capital of each country. Our results suggest that social 
capital is important as a determinant of corporate valuation even when institutional and legal 
determinants are considered.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first reviews the literature on social 
capital to then focus on the development of the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the 
methodology, variables and data sources employed, while Section 4 presents the empirical 
findings. Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
2. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CORPORATE VALUE 
The study of social capital has attracted academic attention since Putnam (1993), in which 
social capital is used to explain differences in the economic and institutional performance of 
northern and southern Italy. Putnam (1993) shows that civic engagement is a determinant of 
the performance of local governments across Italian regions following constitutional reform in 
1970, revealing that those Italian regions in which the public actively participate in civic 
activities (as a proxy of a high tendency to cooperate) are also the regions in which local 
governments show high levels of economic and institutional performance. The paper thus 
offers evidence that the regional governments in the more-trusting, more civic-minded 
northern and central regions of Italy provide public services more effectively than do those in 
the less-trusting, less civic-minded southern regions of Italy.  
Knack and Keefer (1997) provide evidence of the importance of social capital on aggregate 
economic activity. Their paper tests the impact of interpersonal trust and civic norms (as 
measures of social capital) on both growth and investment rates for 29 different countries, 
revealing that the social capital variables exhibit a positive significant relationship with growth 
and investment. Knack and Keefer (1997) also report a significantly positive relationship 
between trust and output, capital and schooling. Furthermore, the impact of trust is higher in 
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poorer countries where contracts are not reliably enforced by the legal system and where 
access to formal sources of credit is more limited due to the lesser development of the 
financial sector. 
More recently, Zak and Knack (2001) empirically examine the predictions of a model in which 
heterogeneous agents transact and face a moral hazard problem for a sample of 44 countries. 
The model produces two main predictions: (1) higher trust increases investment and growth, 
and (2) homogeneous societies and egalitarian distributions of income enhance trust. Their 
empirical results reveal: (1) that investment is higher in countries where income inequalities 
are lower, where investment good prices are relatively low, and where trust is higher; and (2) a 
positive relationship between trust and growth. La Porta et al. (1997) show that the effects of 
trust on performance are statistically significant and quantitatively large. Trust raises judicial 
efficiency, bureaucratic quality and tax compliance, while corruption decreases with increasing 
trust. Moreover, trust has an effect on large firms’ share of the economy, being found to 
increase the ratio of total sales of the 20 largest publicly traded firms in a country relative to its 
GNP. In line with Knack and Keefer (1997), Goergen (2013) show that trust has a positive effect 
on economic growth, an effect which is maintained after considering the influence of 
employment protection regulation and investor rights. Trust explains differences in economic 
growth among countries, while also explaining choices in terms of the institutional setting and 
investor and employment rights. 
The previous literature shows that there is widespread consensus that economic activities that 
require some participants to rely on the future actions of others are accomplished at a lower 
cost in more-trusting and civic-minded environments. This evidence is consistent with the view 
of Arrow (1972), suggesting that much of the economic backwardness in the world is due to 
the lack of mutual confidence. Economic activities in which social capital is relevant include the 
provision of services or goods in exchange for future payment, contracts to accomplish tasks 
that are difficult to monitor, and investment decisions that rely on assurances by governments. 
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The benefits of higher-trust societies include less expenses associated with protecting 
individuals from being exploited in economic transactions, less covenants in written contracts 
to specify every potential contingency, less litigation procedures, less resources for bribes, and 
less time devoted to monitoring partners, employees, suppliers, borrowers, and/or managers. 
In general, individuals in more-trusting and civic-minded countries are less dependent on 
formal institutions to enforce agreements and spend less to protect themselves from being 
exploited in economic transactions because interpersonal trust and civic norms reduce the 
cost of transactions and foster greater output. Due to the fact that the cost of transactions 
decreases with increasing trust, high trust countries will produce more output than low trust 
countries. Furthermore, more-trusting and civic-minded societies have a stronger incentive to 
innovate, accumulate physical capital, and obtain returns on the accumulation of human 
capital. Trust and civic-mindedness not only have these direct effects on economic activity, but 
may also improve economic output indirectly through political decisions (Putnam, 1993; La 
Porta et al., 1997). Within this context, we expect a positive influence of interpersonal trust 
and civic norms on corporate valuation. Hence, the main hypothesis tested in this paper is the 
following: 
H1. More-trusting and civic-minded environments will have a positive relationship with 
corporate valuation. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) show that the influence of trust on growth is higher in poorer 
countries, where contracts are not reliably enforced by the legal system and where access to 
formal sources of credit is more limited due to an underdeveloped financial sector. From this 
point of view, we would expect the influence of social capital to be higher in less economically 
developed countries. However, the effect of social capital on corporate valuation may increase 
with the economic development of the country, given that the number of transactions 
increases in developed countries. Consequently, the relevance of trust and civic norms should 
be higher in richer countries (Putnam, 1993). As both types of relationship between social 
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capital and economic development are theoretically possible, we make no a priori forecast as 
to whether the effect of social capital is higher or lower according to the level of economic 
development, treating it as an empirical issue. 
3. DATABASES, METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLES 
The influence of social capital in explaining cross-country differences in corporate valuation is 
analysed for a sample of firms in 55 countries obtained from Compustat for the period 1996-
2011 Our measure of valuation is Tobin’s q (QTOBIN), defined as the ratio between the book 
value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common 
equity and the book value of assets (Claessens et al., 2002; Durnev and Kim, 2005; La Porta et 
al., 2002). We compute Tobin’s q for each firm for each year of the sample period. The median 
value for each year and country is consequently calculated3. Our empirical model is the 
following: 
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The estimations are carried out using ordinary least squares with year- and country-fixed effect 
(
kt
kt ). This specific effect aims to control for most of the shocks affecting corporate 
valuation. This approach has the advantage of being less likely to suffer from omitted variable 
bias or model specification than traditional regressions (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008). We estimate 
all our models with robust standard error and, in line with Petersen (2009), cluster the error 
term by country. 
                                                          
3 A minimum number of 5 firms for year and country is required for a country to be included in the 
sample. The mean percentage of the market capitalization for the 55 countries in our sample compared 
with the market capitalization of the countries obtained from World Bank Cross Country Data is 69.87%. 
Furthermore, only 8 countries in our sample have a percentage below 35% of the market capitalization of 
the country. These countries are Bulgaria, Egypt, Croatia, India, Jordan, Romania, Venezuela and 
Zimbabwe. When these countries are excluded from the estimations, the results are maintained. 
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We test the impact of social capital (SOCIAL_CAPITAL) on corporate valuation using 
interpersonal trust (TRUST) and civic norms (CIVIC) as proxies of social capital. Interpersonal 
trust and civic norms are obtained from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values 
Surveys (EVS), which are conducted in different countries in several “waves”. The measure of 
trust we consider is the percentage of respondents in each country agreeing that “most people 
can be trusted”; hence, trust varies between 100 per cent (maximum value of interpersonal 
trust) and 0 per cent (minimum value of interpersonal trust)4. 
An alternative measure of social capital that proxies the strength of civic cooperation norms is 
obtained from responses to questions about whether each of the following behaviours “can 
always be justified, can never be justified, or something in between”: (1) Justifiable: Claiming 
government benefits which you are not entitled to; (2) Justifiable: Avoiding a fare on public 
transport; (3) Justifiable: Cheating on taxes if you have the chance; and (4) Justifiable: 
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties. The value of each question varies 
between 1 (can never be justified) and 10 (can always be justified). We create an index that is 
the sum of the values of the four questions5. Thus, the CIVIC variable ranges between 4 
(maximum value of civic cooperation) and 40 (minimum value of civic cooperation), 
constituting an inverse measure of civic cooperation in the country6. 
Trust data from World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS) has previously 
been used by Goergen (2013), Goergen et al. (2013), Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta et al. 
(1997), and Zak and Knack (2001). Although, these surveys may have a wide range of potential 
problems (Inglehart, 1994), they produce values that are consistent with information from 
other sources. This is the case of a social experiment conducted by Reader’s Digest7. The 
                                                          
4 To compute this percentage of respondents, the “don’t know” responses were previously removed. 
5 Knack and Keefer (1997) use a similar measure of norms of civic cooperation, in which they consider 
five instead of four components, as one of the components was not included in the latest surveys. 
6 As there is no data for TRUST and CIVIC for each year, the prior values of these variables are used 
when they are not available for any given year. 
7 A description of this social experiment can be followed at www.rd.com/slideshows/most-honest-cities-
lost-wallet-test/#slideshow. 
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magazine wanted to know how honest world cities are, so it dropped 192 wallets in 16 cities –
that is 12 wallets in each city– to see how many would be returned. Each wallet contained $50 
equivalent of local currency, as well as a name, phone number, family photo, coupons, and 
business cards. The number of wallets returned with their content was recorded for each city. 
The percentage of wallets returned in each country closely tracks the WVS/EVS measures, as it 
is correlated with TRUST at 0.67 (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Furthermore, most country values 
are consistent with popular impressions and anecdotal evidence, as the highest values of trust 
are reported for the Nordic countries. In the experiment conducted by Reader’s Digest, the 
least honest city was Lisbon, where only 1 out of the 12 wallets was returned (by a non-
resident visiting the city). The median value of TRUST for Portugal in our sample is 15.27, which 
is far from the values of Nordic countries (Norway 69.17, Denmark 67.24, Sweden 65.39, and 
Finland 53.18). 
To reduce endogeneity problems, we measure corporate valuation subsequent to the 
measurement of interpersonal trust and civic norms8. However, as social capital may not be 
totally exogenous, we resolve this question of potential endogeneity using instrumental 
variables estimation. We consider several variables as instruments of TRUST and CIVIC. The 
instruments for TRUST and CIVIC include the percentage of the population belonging to a 
hierarchical religion (Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, or Muslim), an index of ethnolinguistic 
diversity, the logarithm of GDP per capita, and the number of lawyers per population in 
millions (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Goergen, 2013; Goergen et al., 2013; La Porta et al., 1997; 
and Zak and Knack, 2001). Year and country fixed effects are also considered for both 
variables. We subsequently perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test of overidentifying 
restrictions for each of the regressions. This test verifies the null hypothesis that the 
introduction of instrumental variables has no influence on the coefficients of the estimations. 
We accordingly perform a DWH F test for each of the estimations in our paper, the results of 
                                                          
8 Furthermore, interpersonal trust may be assumed as exogenous, as it does not vary substantially across 
time (La Porta et al., 1997). 
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which are reported in the bottom rows of each table. When the p value of the F test falls 
below 10 percent, the null hypothesis is rejected and the instrumental variables estimations 
are reported. Otherwise, the estimations with the observed values of TRUST and CIVIC 
variables are provided. 
In line with previous research analysing corporate valuation, we consider growth 
opportunities, shareholders’ rights, legal enforcement and corruption as determinants of the 
differences in corporate valuation (La Porta et al., 2002; Lee and Ng, 2006; Chua et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, we also consider the influence of the protection of creditors’ rights on corporate 
valuation. We use the GDP growth rate to measure the growth opportunities in a country 
(GROWTH). GDP growth rate data are from the World Bank and are calculated as the annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. 
In order to measure legal enforcement (LEGAL_ENFORC) and corruption (CORRUPTION), we 
use data from Worldwide Governance and the Heritage Foundation, respectively. As a 
measure of legal enforcement, we use the Worldwide Governance rule of law indicator, which 
captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and, in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. This indicator ranges between 
2.5 and -2.5, with high values indicating stronger legal enforcement. As a proxy for corruption, 
we consider the Heritage Foundation’s Freedom from Corruption Index, which measures the 
reduction in economic freedom caused by introducing insecurity and uncertainty in economic 
relationships. This index is based on a 100-point scale in which a score of 100 indicates very 
little corruption and a score of 0 indicates a very corrupt government9. 
                                                          
9 This index relies on the following sources for information on informal market activities, in the following 
order of priority: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011; U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Country Commercial Guide, 2009–2012; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, 
2009–2012; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2012 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign 
Trade Barriers; and official government publications of each country. 
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Finally, our study also includes the explanatory variables: protection of creditors’ rights and 
shareholders’ rights. Data on creditors’ rights (CREDITOR_RIGHTS) are from Djankov et al. 
(2007) and analyse some rights of secured lenders which are defined in the laws and 
regulations of different countries. This variable measures four powers of secured lenders in 
bankruptcy: (1) whether there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, when a debtor files 
for reorganization; (2) whether secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the 
petition for reorganization is approved, i.e. whether there is no automatic stay or asset freeze 
imposed by the court; (3) whether secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of 
liquidating a bankrupt firm; and (4) whether an administrator, and not management, is 
responsible for running the business during the reorganization. A value of one is added to the 
index when a country’s laws and regulations provide each one of these powers to secured 
lenders. It thus ranges between 0 and 4, with higher values indicating stronger creditors’ rights 
or stronger protection against borrower expropriation. To measure shareholder rights, we use 
the anti-self-dealing index (SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS) provided by Djankov et al. (2008). This 
index focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, 
governing a specific self-dealing transaction and varies between 1 (maximum shareholder 
protection) and 0 (minimum shareholder protection). 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the 
whole sample, including the mean, median, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum 
values. The average value of the dependent variable (QTOBIN) is 1.11. The average value of 
TRUST is 30.18, whereas that of CIVIC is 8.92. Panel B presents the mean values of the 
dependent and independent variables by country. The number of firms and the number of 
observations in each country are also provided. The third column in Table 1 presents the mean 
QTOBIN for each country. As can be seen, corporate valuation varies greatly across countries. 
For example, China has the highest QTOBIN (1.56) among all our sample countries, followed by 
the United States (1.45) and Australia (1.40). These values contrast with Latvia (0.62) and 
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Venezuela (0.71), which have the lowest levels of corporate valuation. Column 5 shows the 
values of TRUST, which varies substantially across countries. Norway has the highest trust level 
(69.17), followed by Denmark (67.24) and Sweden (65.39). In contrast, Turkey (5.17), Brazil 
(5.60) and Peru (7.39) have the lowest trust levels in our sample. Column 6 in Panel B presents 
the mean value of civic norms for each country. As can be seen, Pakistan has the lowest level 
(5.11), followed by Turkey (5.74) and Zimbabwe (6.01). In contrast, countries such as Malaysia 
(14.50), the Philippines (13.60) and Thailand (13.02) present the highest values of civic norms. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. The data are from 1996 to 2011 for the 55 
countries shown in the table. Our measure of corporate valuation is Tobin’s q (QTOBIN), defined as the ratio between the book 
value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity and the book value of assets. 
TRUST is the percentage of respondents agreeing that “most people can be trusted”, obtained from the World Values Surveys 
(WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS). CIVIC is an index that proxies the strength of civic cooperation norms and is likewise 
obtained from WVS and EVS. LEGAL_ENFORC is the Worldwide Governance rule of law indicator. CORRUPTION is the corruption 
index obtained from the Heritage Foundation. CREDITOR_RIGHTS measures the protection of creditors’ rights. 
SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS measures the protection of shareholders’ rights. GROWTH is the GDP annual growth rate. LN_GDP is the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita, GDP per capita being the gross domestic product in constant local currency divided by the 
midyear population. 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 # observations Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
QTOBIN 756 1.11 0.29 1.07 0.28 3.65 
TRUST 756 30.18 16.33 28.85 2.80 76.04 
CIVIC 705 8.92 1.98 8.55 5.11 14.50 
LEGAL_ENFORC 756 0.71 0.95 0.85 -1.76 2.00 
CORRUPTION 756 57.38 24.15 52.00 7.00 99.00 
CREDITOR_RIGHTS 756 1.96 1.11 2.00 0.00 4.00 
SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS 756 0.47 0.22 0.44 0.09 1.00 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics by country  
Country # firms  # observations  QTOBIN TRUST CIVIC  LEGAL_ENFORC CORRUPTION  CREDITOR_RIGHTS SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS GROWTH LN_GDP 
Argentina 71 798 0.92 16.51 8.28 -0.37 33.64 1.00 0.34 3.05 9.02 
Australia 1,733 14,557 1.40 43.60 7.44 1.74 85.75 3.00 0.76 3.36 10.73 
Austria 89 1,015 1.05 34.58 8.62 1.85 79.69 3.00 0.21 2.12 10.66 
Belgium 131 1,480 1.12 31.38 10.37 1.29 68.62 2.00 0.54 1.89 10.62 
Brazil 322 2308 0.99 5.60 12.87 -0.31 36.12 1.00 0.27 3.07 9.13 
Bulgaria 21 69 1.15 21.97 7.78 -0.12 39.33 2.00 0.65 2.62 8.76 
Canada 718 7,779 1.32 42.25 7.61 1.72 88.75 1.00 0.64 2.63 10.69 
Chile 156 1,827 1.09 18.06 10.96 1.22 69.94 2.00 0.63 4.12 9.27 
China 2,378 14,797 1.56 52.98 7.45 -0.42 32.19 2.00 0.76 9.83 7.72 
Colombia 38 299 0.93 12.40 9.52 -0.67 32.31 0.00 0.57 3.32 8.56 
Croatia 25 150 0.93 20.28 9.58 0.01 39.00 3.00 0.25 2.21 9.42 
Czech Rep 12 113 1.01 26.68 9.90 0.83 46.50 3.00 0.33 2.85 9.70 
Denmark 170 1,812 1.05 67.24 6.31 1.89 83.94 3.00 0.46 1.36 10.93 
Egypt 41 265 1.21 27.41 6.54 -0.07 31.38 2.00 0.20 4.76 7.69 
Finland 124 1,584 1.22 53.18 8.24 1.94 89.12 1.00 0.46 2.80 10.63 
France 645 7,180 1.16 20.44 10.96 1.41 70.44 0.00 0.38 1.66 10.56 
Germany 783 7,813 1.19 35.22 8.69 1.63 79.75 3.00 0.28 1.40 10.56 
Greece 218 1,929 1.24 22.99 11.60 0.76 45.31 1.00 0.22 1.64 10.17 
Hong Kong 432 4,043 0.97 41.05 8.55 1.53 81.71 4.00 0.96 4.60 10.30 
Hungary 17 173 1.15 25.59 10.56 0.84 50.06 1.00 0.18 2.29 9.34 
India 1,959 11,399 1.06 32.66 9.50 0.14 28.31 2.00 0.58 7.03 6.81 
Indonesia 359 3,774 1.05 46.73 7.37 -0.74 21.62 2.00 0.65 4.96 7.81 
Ireland 60 696 1.36 37.78 8.86 1.61 75.43 1.00 0.79 4.55 10.67 
Israel 249 1,786 1.10 23.45 - 0.96 72.33 3.00 0.73 3.03 10.17 
Italy 260 2,878 1.08 31.62 7.69 0.62 49.56 2.00 0.42 0.87 10.49 
Japan 3,545 47,715 0.97 41.13 6.65 1.29 70.68 2.81 0.50 0.71 10.62 
Jordan 175 887 1.14 29.62 6.49 0.34 49.00 1.00 0.16 5.65 8.16 
Korea Rep 1,582 15,894 0.90 29.41 8.67 0.87 47.75 3.00 0.47 4.25 9.72 
Latvia 23 154 0.62 20.06 11.60 0.51 65.57 3.00 0.32 4.46 9.12 
Malaysia 911 10,058 0.87 8.80 14.50 0.51 50.00 3.00 0.95 4.68 9.04 
Mexico 106 1,169 1.07 21.42 12.67 -0.54 34.94 0.00 0.17 3.10 9.04 
Morocco 54 285 1.30 17.52 6.80 -0.08 37.77 1.00 0.56 4.32 7.75 
Netherlands 140 1,802 1.24 52.01 7.92 1.74 88.62 3.00 0.20 2.18 10.74 
New Zealand 113 1,063 1.22 49.97 7.45 1.84 94.19 4.00 0.95 2.27 10.34 
Nigeria 81 415 1.33 23.51 8.04 -1.31 18.50 4.00 0.43 4.58 - 
Norway 198 1,751 1.16 69.17 7.88 1.90 87.56 2.00 0.42 2.19 11.33 
Pakistan 241 2,219 1.04 25.50 5.11 -0.79 23.11 1.00 0.41 3.75 6.73 
Peru 81 741 0.98 7.39 9.94 -0.66 36.50 0.00 0.45 4.78 8.22 
Philippines 209 2,416 0.89 7.58 13.60 -0.27 29.77 1.00 0.22 4.02 7.37 
Poland 371 2,430 1.13 18.78 8.77 0.59 46.06 1.00 0.29 4.41 9.13 
Portugal 50 601 1.06 15.27 9.08 1.14 64.18 1.00 0.44 1.63 9.96 
Romania 39 148 1.02 16.01 8.38 -0.11 32.73 2.60 0.44 2.31 - 
Russia 164 834 0.96 25.75 11.27 -0.91 24.87 1.75 0.44 3.90 8.95 
Singapore 643 6,167 1.04 14.70 9.02 1.44 90.83 3.00 1.00 5.34 10.39 
Slovenia 20 164 0.97 19.46 10.14 1.00 58.57 3.00 0.29 2.91 9.94 
South Africa 312 3,153 1.19 15.71 9.24 0.09 49.31 3.00 0.81 3.28 8.78 
Spain 139 1,695 1.18 26.78 8.30 1.23 62.81 2.50 0.37 2.60 10.27 
Sweden 373 3,317 1.30 65.39 9.15 1.85 92.31 1.00 0.33 2.72 10.74 
Switzerland 252 3,168 1.12 43.94 7.95 1.87 88.50 1.00 0.27 1.85 11.13 
Thailand 529 5,984 1.01 41.50 13.02 -0.11 35.00 2.00 0.81 3.25 8.44 
Turkey 180 1,505 1.31 5.17 5.74 0.01 35.06 2.00 0.43 4.33 9.04 
United Kingdom 1,655 17,230 1.15 29.84 8.28 1.67 85.31 4.00 0.95 2.24 10.49 
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United States 2,783 39,397 1.45 37.62 7.85 1.54 76.31 1.00 0.65 2.45 10.72 
Venezuela 26 199 0.71 14.95 8.76 -0.99 24.33 3.00 0.09 1.03 9.37 
Zimbabwe 23 117 0.95 11.17 6.01 -1.40 33.16 4.00 0.39 -5.69 7.06 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix between the independent and dependent variables. High 
correlations do not exist among the variables used in the models, which could give rise to 
multicollinearity problems and hence inconsistent estimations in our models. 
Table 2. Correlations 
This table presents the correlation matrix. Our measure of corporate valuation is Tobin’s q (QTOBIN), defined as the ratio between 
the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity and the book value of 
assets. GROWTH is the GDP annual growth rate. TRUST is the percentage of respondents agreeing that “most people can be 
trusted”, obtained from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS). CIVIC is an index that proxies the 
strength of civic cooperation norms and is likewise obtained from WVS and EVS. LEGAL_ENFORC is the Worldwide Governance 
rule of law indicator. CORRUPTION is the corruption index obtained from the Heritage Foundation. CREDITOR_RIGHTS measures 
the protection of creditors’ rights. SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS measures the protection of shareholders’ rights. LN_GDP is the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita, GDP per capita being the gross domestic product in constant local currency divided by the midyear 
population. 
QTOBIN GROWTH TRUST CIVIC LEGAL_ENFORC CORRUPTION CREDITOR_RIGHTS SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS 
QTOBIN 1        
GROWTH 0.2379 1       
TRUST 0.2423 -0.0317 1      
CIVIC -0.1746 0.0453 -0.4190 1     
LEGAL_ENFORC 0.1943 -0.1570 0.5747 -0.1838 1    
CORRUPTION 0.1816 -0.1715 0.5589 -0.1858 0.8987 1   
CREDITOR_RIGHTS -0.0634 -0.0751 0.1791 -0.2195 0.1942 0.2038 1  
SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS 0.1714 0.1250 0.1569 -0.1294 0.1580 0.2203 0.2962 1 
LN_GDP 0.1490 -0.2829 0.4600 -0.0811 0.8396 0.7990 0.1973 0.0407 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the dependent variable, QTOBIN, has a positive relationship with 
legal enforcement, corruption, the protection of shareholders’ rights, and trust, but correlates 
negatively with the protection of creditor rights and civic norms. Likewise, interpersonal trust 
has a positive correlation with legal enforcement, corruption, the protection of shareholders’ 
rights, and the protection of creditors’ rights, but a negative correlation with civic norms. In 
contrast, CIVIC correlates negatively with legal enforcement, corruption, the protection of 
shareholders’ rights and creditors’ rights, and trust. As the correlation between legal 
enforcement and corruption is very high, these two variables are included alternatively in the 
estimations. The mean VIF factors are reported in the bottom row of Tables 3 and 4. All mean 
VIF factors are below the benchmark of 10, which is indicative of the absence of 
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multicollinearity between the independent variables. The mean VIF factors increase in Table 4 
due to the inclusion of interaction terms. 
4. Determinants of corporate valuation. 
The economic benefits of social capital have been argued by Putnam (1993), Knack and Keefer 
(1997), Zak and Knack (2001), Goergen (2013), and Goergen et al. (2013). However, these 
papers do not analyse their influence on corporate valuation. In this section, we therefore 
carry out an in-depth study of the relationship between social capital and country firm 
valuation. Table 3 examines the effect of social capital (interpersonal trust and civic norms) on 
corporate valuation across countries. We first study the effects of social capital on corporate 
valuation considering the two proxies: interpersonal trust (column 1) and civic norms (column 
2). In column (1), the coefficient for TRUST is positive, as expected, and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, while the coefficient for the GDP annual growth rate is also positive and 
significant at the 1% level, in line with Chua et al. (2007). Similarly, column (2) shows that civic 
norms have a negative and significant coefficient10 at the 5% level, while the coefficient of 
GROWTH is positive and statistically significant, as in column (1). The positive coefficient of 
TRUST and the negative coefficient of CIVIC are consistent with more-trusting and civic-minded 
environments being positively influenced by social capital, as predicted in the first hypothesis. 
The signs in the coefficients of TRUST and CIVIC are maintained when the characteristics of the 
legal and institutional environment are considered in the estimations in columns (3) through to 
(8). Similarly, the country’s GDP annual growth rate presents a positive and significant 
coefficient in all the estimations. In columns (3) through to (8), we examine the effects of legal 
enforcement, corruption, and protection of shareholders’ and creditors’ rights and whether 
the inclusion of these variables has any effect on the influence of social capital on corporate 
valuation. Legal enforcement (LEGAL_ENFORC) has a positive influence on corporate valuation 
that is statistically significant in columns (3) and (7). The level of corruption in a country 
                                                          
10 The CIVIC index varies between 4 and 40, with higher values indicating low levels of civic 
cooperation. 
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reduces corporate valuation, as low values of CORRUPTION indicate very corrupt countries. 
Corporate valuation increases in countries with high levels of protection of shareholders’ 
rights, revealing that shareholders pay more for firms in environments with better legal 
protection because the risk of being expropriated by a controlling shareholder is lower. The 
effect of legal enforcement, corruption, and protection of shareholders’ rights is consistent 
with the results obtained by Chua et al. (2007). Finally, we examine the relationship between 
the protection of creditor’s rights and firm value. This relationship is found to be negative and 
statistically significant in most of the estimations. When the rights of creditors are better 
protected, they will be more likely to force repayment and gain the control of firms (Aghion 
and Bolton, 1992). This will enable more entrepreneurs to finance their investments externally, 
while also reducing the value that shareholders are willing to pay for shares. 
Table 3. Corporate valuation and social capital. 
The dependent variable is QTOBIN, which is measured as the ratio between the book value of assets minus the book 
value of common equity plus the market value of common equity and the book value of assets. GROWTH is the GDP 
annual growth rate. TRUST is the percentage of respondents agreeing that “most people can be trusted”, obtained 
from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS). CIVIC is an index that proxies the 
strength of civic cooperation norms and is likewise obtained from WVS and EVS. LEGAL_ENFORC is the Worldwide 
Governance rule of law indicator. CORRUPTION is the corruption index obtained from the Heritage Foundation. 
CREDITOR_RIGHTS measures the protection of creditors’ rights. SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS measures the protection of 
shareholders’ rights. Time and country effects are included in all the estimations, although we do not report their 
coefficients. Regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard error and clustering the error term by 
country. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman statistic tests the null hypothesis that the introduction of instrumental variables 
has no inﬂuence on the coefﬁcients of the estimations. We report instrumental variable estimations if the test is 
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.9063*** (18.23) 
1.2857*** 
(13.43) 
0.9682*** 
(20.46) 
0.8733*** 
(13.41) 
0.9072*** 
(15.46) 
0.8519*** 
(13.50) 
1.2036*** 
(11.53) 
1.1239*** 
(9.01) 
GROWTH 0.0196*** (4.50) 
0.0219*** 
(4.59) 
0.0199*** 
(3.63) 
0.0201*** 
(3.64) 
0.0191*** 
(4.10) 
0.0191*** 
(4.05) 
0.0224*** 
(4.40) 
0.0225*** 
(4.38) 
TRUST 0.0045*** (3.58)    
0.0031** 
(2.05) 
0.0033** 
(2.25)   
CIVIC  -0.0271** (-2.56)     
-0.0243** 
(-2.43) 
-0.0249** 
(-2.36) 
LEGAL_ENFORC   0.0735*** (3.25)  
0.0436 
(1.61)  
0.0678*** 
(3.25)  
CORRUPTION    0.0027*** (3.32)  
0.0014 
(1.46)  
0.0024*** 
(3.35) 
CREDITOR_RIGHTS   -0.0350* (-1.69) 
-0.0335 
(-1.62) 
-0.0378* 
(-1.93) 
-0.0371* 
(-1.90) 
-0.0450** 
(-2.21) 
-0.0458** 
(-2.22) 
SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS   0.1798* (1.80) 
0.1633 
(1.53) 
0.1698* 
(1.93) 
0.1611* 
(1.71) 
0.1732** 
(1.99) 
0.1632* 
(1.77) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 756 705 756 756 756 756 705 705 
# countries 55 54 55 55 55 55 54 54 
F test 9.39*** 11.01*** 6.89*** 7.38*** 6.61*** 7.04*** 11.53*** 12.72*** 
R squared (%) 12.00 10.68 13.92 13.11 15.97 15.59 19.05 18.33 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.41 0.87 - - 0.52 0.57 0.68 0.42 
Mean VIF 1.01 1.01 1.10 1.11 1.26 1.25 1.11 1.12 
15 
 
The influence of the social capital proxies is economically significant. Using the coefficients in 
columns (5) and (7), a one-standard deviation increase in TRUST and CIVIC would respectively 
cause a variation in corporate valuation of 4.56 and -4.33 per cent. This respectively represents 
17.46 and -16.59 per cent of the standard deviation of corporate valuation. These results 
confirm our first hypothesis even when other institutional and legal characteristics are 
considered. 
Table 4 shows the results when we consider whether the effect of social capital on corporate 
valuation varies according to the level of economic development of the country. The evidence 
documented by Knack and Keefer (1997) shows that the influence of trust on growth is higher 
in less developed countries, where contracts are not reliably enforced by the legal system and 
where access to formal sources of credit is more limited due to an underdeveloped financial 
sector. However, Putnam (1993) posits that the relevance of social capital should be higher in 
richer countries, as it could reduce transaction costs and the number of transactions is higher 
in more economically developed countries.  
In this context, we incorporate a new variable in our model related to the economic 
development of the country (LN_GDP). LN_GDP is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, 
GDP per capita being the gross domestic product in constant local currency divided by the 
midyear population. In columns (1) and (2), TRUST measures the effect of this variable on 
corporate valuation in less developed countries, while the interaction term LN_GDP*TRUST 
measures the differential influence of TRUST in countries with higher GDP per capita. 
On the one hand, TRUST and the interaction term LN_GDP*TRUST are positive and negative, 
respectively, in columns (1) and (2), although not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
The negative coefficient associated with the interaction term suggests that the effect of TRUST 
is higher in richer countries, although the differences are not statistically significant at 
standard levels. 
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Table 4. Corporate valuation, social capital and economic development 
The dependent variable is QTOBIN, which is measured as the ratio between the book value of assets minus the book 
value of common equity plus the market value of common equity and the book value of assets. GROWTH is the GDP 
annual growth rate. TRUST is the percentage of respondents agreeing that “most people can be trusted”, obtained 
from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS). CIVIC is an index that proxies the 
strength of civic cooperation norms and is likewise obtained from WVS and EVS. LN_GDP is the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita, GDP per capita being the gross domestic product in constant local currency divided by the midyear 
population. LEGAL_ENFORC is the Worldwide Governance rule of law indicator. CORRUPTION is the corruption 
index obtained from the Heritage Foundation. CREDITOR_RIGHTS measures the protection of creditors’ rights. 
SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS measures the protection of shareholders’ rights. Time and country effects are included in all 
the estimations, although we do not report their coefficients. Time and country effects are included in all the 
estimations, although we do not report their coefficients. Regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard 
error and clustering the error term by country. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
introduction of instrumental variables has no inﬂuence on the coefﬁcients of the estimations. We report 
instrumental variable estimations if the test is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.6313 (1.44) 
0.4252 
(1.12) 
1.8807*** 
(3.10) 
1.7323*** 
(2.97) 
GROWTH 0.0179*** (3.58) 
0.0183*** 
(3.90) 
0.0229*** 
(3.81) 
0.0237*** 
(4.27) 
TRUST 0.0098 (0.92) 
0.0116 
(1.13)   
CIVIC   -0.1360** (-2.10) 
-0.1401** 
(-2.02) 
LN_GDP 0.0311 (0.71) 
0.0480 
(1.21) 
-0.0775 
(-1.13) 
-0.0653 
(-0.97) 
LN_GDP*TRUST -0.0007 (-0.71) 
-0.0009 
(-0.88)   
LN_GDP*CIVIC   0.0125* (1.74) 
0.0128 
(1.67) 
LEGAL_ENFORC 0.0515 (1.34)  
0.0566* 
(1.71)  
CORRUPTION  0.0013 (0.93)  
0.0014 
(1.18) 
CREDITOR_RIGHTS -0.0517*** (-2.75) 
-0.0507*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.0553*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.0553*** 
(-2.93) 
SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS 0.1808** (2.03) 
0.1736* 
(1.70) 
0.2095** 
(2.31) 
0.2103** 
(2.15) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 733 733 682 682 
# countries 53 53 52 52 
F test 7.23*** 6.53*** 13.74*** 14.45*** 
R squared (%) 17.96 17.63 22.38 21.96 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.43 0.45 0.69 0.71 
Mean VIF 25.58 26.56 24.14 6.24 
 
On the other hand, CIVIC has a negative influence on corporate valuation that is marginally 
significant different depending on the level of economic development of the countries. The 
interaction term LN_GDP*CIVIC has a positive and significant coefficient in column (3) and 
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non-significant coefficient in column (4). These results show that corporate valuation increases 
with civic cooperation, with some differences among countries depending on their level of 
economic development, revealing that the positive relationship between civil norms and 
corporate valuation is predominant in poorer countries. This result is consistent with Knack 
and Keefer (1997). 
The coefficients of the characteristics of the legal and institutional environment considered in 
the estimations are similar to those provided in Table 3. The GDP annual growth rate presents 
a positive and significant influence in all the estimations. Legal enforcement and protection of 
shareholders’ rights promote corporate valuation, while protection of creditors’ rights has a 
negative effect on corporate valuation. However, corruption is not significant in explaining 
corporate valuation when we consider the interaction effect between social capital and 
economic development. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper analyses the influence of social capital on corporate valuation for an international 
sample of firms belonging to 55 countries over the period 1996-2011. We show that cross-
country variations in corporate valuation are driven not only by legal and institutional 
characteristics, but also by the country’s social capital. We find that firms in more-trusting and 
civic-minded countries have a higher valuation. Our contribution in this paper is that of 
empirically showing that the social capital variables interpersonal trust and civic cooperation 
play an important role in understanding differences in country firm valuation. This evidence is 
consistent with the literature analysing social capital, which highlights its positive effect on 
investment and growth. Furthermore, we obtain some evidence that the influence of civic 
norms explains corporate valuation to a greater extent in poorer countries. These results allow 
us to confirm the importance of social capital as a significant factor in understanding how firm 
country valuation is built. 
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Furthermore, our results reveal that corporate valuation increases with the GDP annual 
growth rate, legal enforcement, and the protection of shareholders’ rights, whereas it is 
negatively affected by corruption and the protection of creditors’ rights. 
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Appendix A. Variables 
The table shows the definition of variables used in the paper and their sources. 
Name Definition Source 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
QTOBIN 
The ratio between the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market 
value of common equity and the book value of assets for each firm and year. The median value for 
each year and country is calculated. 
Compustat 
 SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES  
TRUST The percentage of respondents in each country agreeing that “most people can be trusted”.  World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Survey (EVS). 
CIVIC 
The strength of civic cooperation norms is obtained from responses to questions about whether each 
of the following behaviours “can always be justified, can never be justified or something in between”: 
(1) claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to; (2) avoiding a fare on public 
transport; (3) cheating on taxes if you have the chance; and (4) someone accepting a bribe in the 
course of their duties. 
World Values Survey (WVS) and 
European Values Survey (EVS). 
 CONTROL VARIABLES  
GROWTH The annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. 
World Bank (World Bank 
national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data 
files). 
LEGAL_ENFORC 
This captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and, in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (Kaufman et al., 2010). 
CORRUPTION 
The index “Freedom from Corruption” measures the reduction in economic freedom caused by 
introducing insecurity and uncertainty in economic relationships. The score for this component of 
Economic Freedom is derived primarily from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) for 2011, which measures the level of corruption in 183 countries. 
Heritage Foundation. 
CREDITOR_RIGHTS 
This index measures four powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy: (1) whether there are restrictions, 
such as creditor consent, when a debtor files for reorganization; (2) whether secured creditors are 
able to seize their collateral after the petition for reorganization is approved, i.e. whether there is no 
automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by the court; (3) whether secured creditors are paid first out 
of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm; and (4) whether an administrator, and not 
management, is responsible for running the business during the reorganization. A value of one is 
added to the index when a country’s laws and regulations provide each one of these powers to 
secured lenders; it thus varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
Djankov et al. (2007). 
SHAREHOLDER_RIGHTS The anti-self-dealing index focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, governing a specific self-dealing transaction. Djankov et al. (2008). 
 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES  
RELIGION The percentage of population belonging to a hierarchical religion (Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, or Muslim). La Porta et al. (1997). 
N_LAWYERS The number of lawyers per population in millions. 
Council of Bars and Law Societies 
of Europe (CCBE), the American 
Bar Association, and various 
national and international 
organizations. Population in 
millions from World 
Development Indicators. 
DIVERSITY The probability that any two randomly chosen inhabitants of a country will have different mother tongues (Lieberson, 1981). Gordon (2005). 
LN_GDP The natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP per capita is gross domestic product in constant local currency divided by the midyear population. 
World Bank (World Bank 
national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data 
files). 
 
 
